(Non)rationality of consumer inflation perceptions by Peter, Eckley
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
(Non)rationality of consumer inflation
perceptions
Eckley Peter
University of Oxford
29 January 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/77082/
MPRA Paper No. 77082, posted 25 February 2017 08:03 UTC
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Non)rationality of consumer inflation 
perceptions 
Peter Eckley 
Department of Economics 
University of Oxford 
Supervised by Professor Chris Bowdler
Abstract: 
We test the rationality of consumer inflation perceptions in Sweden, relaxing assumptions that have 
been maintained in previous literature. Specifically, we test the rational expectations hypothesis on 
survey measures of inflation perceptions, interpreted as nowcasts. We progressively relax 
restrictions on the prior set of loss functions against which the perception errors may be 
rationalised, culminating in the first application to inflation perceptions of the indicator test of 
Patton & Timmerman (2007). We find that inflation perceptions are positively biased in both the 
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same survey. We also find that inflation perceptions fail to efficiently incorporate even the 
information implicit in past perception errors. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the rational expectations revolution of the 1970’s the assumption that economic agents form their 
expectations rationally – as if solving the economist's model, and making efficient use of all available 
information – has become a cornerstone of the dominant economic modelling paradigm. An enormous 
literature has empirically tested the so-called rational expectations hypothesis (REH). Forward-looking inflation 
expectations have been particularly widely studied in light of inflation's role as a nominal anchor in modern 
monetary policy frameworks. The literature has generally rejected at least strong versions of REH. 
Perceptions on the other hand have attracted relatively little empirical work. However, a nascent empirical 
literature has highlighted that consumer inflation perceptions differ substantially, significantly and 
systematically from inflation outturns (e.g. Curto Millet, 2006; Jonung & Laidler, 1988; 2011). This has serious 
but rarely acknowledged implications for both macroeconomic models and the quantification of forward-
looking inflation expectations from qualitative survey responses, both of which typically assume more benign 
properties for inflation perception errors. 
This paper tests the rationality of consumer inflation perceptions in Sweden over the 15-year span from 
1993m1 to 2007m12, using the population-weighted mean of natively quantitative survey responses. Inflation 
perceptions can be conceptualised as ‘nowcasts’ of inflation because official figures are published with a lag of 
one to two months relative to the survey. We thus formalise the rational perceptions hypothesis (RPH) as the 
special case of REH with zero forecast horizon. We then test observable implications of RPH for inflation 
perception errors, steadily relaxing restrictions on the prior set of loss functions  against which the perception 
errors may be rationalised, culminating in the first application to inflation perceptions of the indicator test of 
Patton & Timmerman (2007) which allows us to relax restrictions that have been maintained in previous 
literature.  
We find that Swedish inflation perceptions are positively biased in both the short- and long-run and thus reject 
RPH. This contrasts with some earlier literature using data from the same survey (Jonung & Laidler, 1988; Lein 
& Maag, 2011). We also find that inflation perceptions fail to efficiently incorporate even the information 
implicit in past perception errors. 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 formally states RPH in a loss-theoretic 
framework. Section 3 introduces the data. Section 4 tests RPH under a range of assumptions on the loss 
function and DGP. Section 5 draws conclusions and compares our results to the extant literature. Section 6 
highlights some important implications of our findings for recent theory models of inflation perceptions, 
macroeconomic modelling, and the quantification of forward-looking inflation expectations that are important 
in monetary policy. 
2 The rational perceptions hypotheses 
Our starting point is the recognition that perceptions may be viewed as a special case of expectations, where 
the forecast horizon is zero periods into the future. Therefore tests of the rational expectations hypothesis 
(REH) can be applied to perceptions. 
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Since Muth's (1961) original formulation1, REH has since been reframed in terms of loss functions and 
formalised as follows. For the variable to be forecasted at time 𝑡 over horizon ℎ, 𝑥𝑡+ℎ, there exists some loss 
function, 𝐿∗, among the prior set of loss functions ℒ that are considered possible/plausible a priori, relative to 
which the forecast, ?̃?𝑡+ℎ, minimises expected loss conditional on a given information set, Ωt. More concisely: 
REH: ∃ 𝐿∗ ∈ ℒ s.t. ?̃?𝑡+ℎ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛?̌?𝑡+ℎ  𝐸𝑡[𝐿
∗(𝑥𝑡+ℎ , 𝑥𝑡+ℎ)|Ωt] 
where 𝐸𝑡[∙ |Ωt] denotes the expectations operator at time 𝑡 conditional on Ωt. It is typically assumed that the 
forecaster knows the conditional distribution of 𝑥𝑡+ℎ|Ωt so that their expectations operator coincides with 
that of the stochastic process generating 𝑥𝑡+ℎ. The rational perceptions hypothesis (RPH) is then simply the 
special case with forecast horizon ℎ equal to zero.  
In this study, the variable to be forecasted (or ‘nowcasted’) is 𝑥𝑡 = 𝜋𝑡
𝑛 ≡ 𝑃𝑡 𝑃𝑡−𝑛⁄ − 1, the actual 𝑛 –month 
inflation rate in the reference index 𝑃 up to month 𝑡, and ?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡
𝑛 is the perception formed, in month 𝑡, of 𝜋𝑡
𝑛. 
The available perceptions data is reported monthly and corresponds to annual inflation rates, i.e. 𝑛 = 12, but 
the more general 𝑛 notation will aid discussion of the econometric methodology below. 
RPH is always a joint hypothesis on the three entities underlined above – reference index, information set, 
conditional distribution, and the prior set of loss functions – in addition to the behavioural assumption of 
minimising expected loss and the assumption of knowledge of the unconditional distribution. Assumptions on 
these entities are stated and justified in conjunction with the testing methodology in Section 4. 
3 The data 
3.1 Why Sweden? 
Our monthly Swedish data are particularly appropriate for the purposes of our study for four reasons. 
First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the only natively quantitative (as opposed to directional/qualitative) 
survey data on inflation perceptions at a national scale that is publicly available. This circumvents the need to 
impose questionable distributional assumptions (which become maintained hypotheses throughout testing) to 
arrive at quantified perception figures that can be cardinally compared to actual inflation. 
Second, the 15-year span covered by this series is longer than similar series at sub-national scale or 
unpublished series2. 
Third, the survey question (see below) mentions “inflation” explicitly, as well as “prices in general” making it 
more likely that respondents use an headline inflation index as their reference index rather than, for example, 
the prices of salient individual goods such as petrol or milk. Furthermore, CPI has been the headline official 
inflation index in Sweden since 1954 so the potential for confusion from changing official indices (as in the UK 
from RPI to CPI for example) does not arise. 
                                                          
1
 "The subjective probability distribution of outcomes tends to be distributed, for the same information set about... 
‘objective’ probability distributions of outcomes [predicted by the economic theory]". 
2
 The Inflation Psychology Survey started in August 1997 and is restricted to 500 households in Ohio, USA (M. F. Bryan & 
Venkatu, 2001a, 2001b). The European Commission initiated a quantitative survey in 2003 but had not published the data 
at the time of writing. 
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Fourth, monetary policy in Sweden was remarkably stable throughout the sample period. Just before 1993m1 
when our sample period begins Sweden transitioned from a fixed- to floating-exchange rate regime and 
announced the introduction of inflation targeting (to begin in 1995m1), to which it adhered beyond the end of 
the sample (2007m12). There have been no radical shifts in the exchange rate during the period (see Table 9 in 
the Appendix for a more detailed monetary policy timeline) in contrast to countries that joined the Euro and 
experienced substantial impacts on inflation perceptions following cash changeover in 2002 (Ehrmann, 2006). 
As a result, Bryan and Palmqvist (2005) find that inflation during this period was well approximated as lying in 
a single regime. 
The main shortcoming of our data, which is perhaps the flipside of the stability just mentioned, is that inflation 
was relatively low and stable by historical and international standards during our sample period (in the range 
−1.2 to +5.2 percentage points), so the data can shed little light on the behaviour of inflation perceptions when 
inflation is very high, as it was in the 1970s for example. 
3.2 Sample period 
The start of the sample was dictated by the first publication of monthly perceptions data. Data for an earlier 
quarterly survey was not available to us. 
The end of the sample was dictated by the most recent available data published at the time we undertook the 
original analysis. During further work on this paper data for later years became available. We chose not to 
extend the sample because our exploratory analysis found evidence of a structural break in early 2008. Dias, 
Duarte, & Rua (2010) similarly finds an inflation regime shift in 2008 in Eurozone countries, and assesses it to 
be even more important than the break arising from the cash changeover to Euro in 2002 in Eurozone 
countries. The authors thus end their sample at 2007m12, as do Lein & Maag (2011) and Dräger (2014). 
3.3 Variable definitions 
Inflation is calculated from the non-seasonally adjusted monthly shadow CPI index numbers3. Inflation 
perceptions (?̃?𝑡
12) data derive from responses to a question in the monthly Consumer Tendency Survey4: 
“Compared with 12 months ago, how much higher in percent do you think that prices are now – in other words, 
the present rate of inflation?” 
The only distributional statistics published by SCB are the mean of all responses, and the mean excluding 
extreme responses which are defined as <-5% or >15% (Konjunktur Institutet, n.d.). and which we estimate 
may account for around 5% of responses5. 
                                                          
3
 ‘Shadow CPI’ is the most up-to-date revised figure for that same month at the time we downloaded the data (December 
2008). By comparing perceptions to shadow CPI we are implicitly assuming that rational consumers attempt to nowcast 
‘true’ inflation (of which shadow CPI is the best available estimate) rather than the first official estimate of CPI figure per 
se. In practice, this makes negligible difference to our analysis because CPI revisions are occasional and small (as can be 
seen in Figure 1), usually correcting for minor administrative errors. See SCB (2001) for further details. 
4
 Formerly called the Consumer Survey, and before that the Households’ Purchasing Plans survey. 
5
 According to Figure 3 of Palmqvist & Strömberg (2004) less than 4% of respondents reported inflation expectations 
above 15%, and less than 1% below -5% (although data is only reported for 2001m11 and 2001m12). It seems plausible 
that similar proportions would hold for perceptions, given that mean inflation perceptions closely track expectations (see 
Appendix, Figure 2). 
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Both means are reported after re-weighting to be representative of the Swedish adult population (aged 16 to 
84), with the exclusion of extreme responses done before re-weighting. The population mean is a natural 
empirical counterpart to the representative household found in most macroeconomic models. That said 
neither mean is likely to be an ideal location statistic for the empirical cross-sectional distribution of responses 
because inflation perceptions are commonly found to be non-normally distributed6. We therefore report test 
results for both measures as a robustness check. 
Figure 1 shows 𝜋𝑡
12, ?̃?𝑡
12 and perception errors 𝜋𝑡
12 − ?̃?𝑡
12 over time. 
3.4 Order of integration 
The empirical evidence on the order of integration of inflation is mixed in the literature (e.g. Altissimo, 
Ehrmann, & Smets, 2006) and in our sample (see Appendix). On subsamples of our Swedish data the null of a 
unit root in inflation perceptions has not been rejected in recent literature (e.g. Dräger, 2014; Lein & Maag, 
2011). However, non-rejection does not imply acceptance of the null and the fact that inflation consistently 
remains in a relatively narrow range over 15 years suggests stationarity. We proceed in a manner that 
accommodates either conclusion. 
3.5 Relative timing of survey and information publication 
The price data underlying CPI was collected during the week that the 15th of the month. The corresponding CPI 
was published between 7th and 22nd of the following month7.  The Consumer Tendency Survey was conducted 
over a multi-week period. For example, during 2003 (the only year for which precise dates were available) data 
gathering covered the first 20 days of each month. Thus the most recently published CPI figures available to a 
respondent surveyed in month 𝑡 could be for either 𝑡 − 2 or 𝑡 − 1. 
3.6 Intervention dummies 
We use two intervention dummies:  
 d93 = {
1 if 𝑡 = 1993m1, … ,1993m12
0 otherwise
 
 
(1) 
 dgfk = {
1 if 𝑡 ≥ 2002m1
0 if 𝑡 < 2002m1
 (2) 
  
d93 covers the first year following the announcement of inflation targeting when inflation perceptions were 
relatively flat around the target level of 2% (though this was not due to come into effect officially until 
1995m1) while a large spike in vehicle fuel prices drove CPI inflation up to around 5%, resulting in repeated 
large negative perception errors. Whether this reflects backward-looking perceptions based on 1992 (when 
inflation was around 1.5 to 2%) or anchoring to the policy target or some other cause, d93 prevents these 
outliers dominating the model fit, while retaining information from the intra-year variation. 
dgfk attempts to control for a change, in 2002m1, of the organisation conducting the survey, from SCB to GfK, 
which resulted in estimates of ?̃?𝑡
12 around one percentage point higher during 2001m11-m12 when both 
surveys were run concurrently. Palmqvist and Strömberg (2004) found such a dummy to be less than entirely 
satisfactory, so we also test on subsamples 1993m1–2001m12 and 2002m1–2007m12.  
                                                          
6
 For example Bruine de Bruin et al. (2012) finds substantial right skew and excess kurtosis in the cross-sectional 
distribution of consumer inflation perceptions in other European countries. 
7
 Source: http://www.scb.se/Pages/Standard____33842.aspx, downloaded on 2 April 2009 
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Figure 1: Inflation and inflation perceptions, levels and first differences, Sweden, 1993m1–2007m12 
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4 Testing RPH 
In this Section we report several tests of RPH, interleaving econometric methodology and results.  
Most of the results in this section concern properties of perception errors, which are I(0) under the null of RPH 
regardless of order of integration of 𝜋𝑡
12, so that test statistics have the standard stationary distributions under 
the null. The exception is the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression, from which we want to estimate the perceptions 
bias under the alternative hypothesis. This is discussed in Section 4.2.  
To deduce testable implications of RPH we must first specify our assumptions about the reference index, 
information set, conditional distribution and prior set of loss functions, which are jointly part of RPH as 
highlighted in Section 2. We maintain fixed assumptions about the reference index and information set 
throughout, as outlined in Section 4.1, and we focus on testing RPH under and increasingly general prior set of 
loss functions and conditional distributions. 
4.1 Maintained assumptions 
The reference index is assumed throughout to be the official CPI inflation rate introduced in Section 3. We 
focus on testing RPH under and increasingly general prior set of loss functions and conditional distributions.  
Where an assumption on the information set is necessary for testing (which is not always the case) then we 
assume that it contains (but is not necessarily restricted to) 𝜋𝑡−𝑠
10  , i.e. the part of 𝜋𝑡
12 ≈ 𝜋𝑡
2 + 𝜋𝑡−2
10  that is 
publicly available throughout the period during which the survey for month 𝑡 is conducted (see Section 3.5). 
Therefore under RPH the problem is essentially to ‘nowcast’ 𝜋𝑡
2 based on the information set. We do not 
attempt to assess rationality with respect to the ‘ragged edge’ of incomplete information on current and 
immediate past values of inflation that may be publicly observable ahead of the announcement of official CPI 
as discussed in Wallis (1986), nor do we concern ourselves with private information.  
The assumptions regarding information set and conditional distribution are in general intimately related. The 
‘conditional’ in conditional distribution of 𝜋𝑡
12 refers to conditioning on the information set. Changing the 
information set – in particular adding or removing information relevant to nowcasting inflation – could change 
the conditional distribution. Thus, in general, a rejection of RPH obtained under a particular restrictions on the 
information set and conditional distribution, only implies rejection of RPH under that pair of restrictions. 
Nevertheless for all combinations of assumptions on the loss function and conditional distribution that are 
tested in this paper, a rejection of RPH using a particular information set Ω also implies rejection of RPH for 
any information set that is a superset of Ω, so long as the assumptions (if any) on the corresponding 
conditional distribution still hold. This is because all the combinations tested below imply exclusion restrictions 
(in a regression context) or orthogonality restrictions (with respect to perception errors) for all items of the 
information set, under the null of RPH. For example, under MSE or MAE loss, RPH implies unbiased 
perceptions without making any assumptions on Ω or the conditional distribution (see below), so that if we 
can reject unbiasedness then this rejection holds for empty Ω and thus for any information set, which could 
include the ‘ragged edge’ and arbitrary private information, and for any conditional distribution. 
4.2 Mean-square error (MSE) loss 
If the loss function is of MSE form (i.e. 𝐿 ∝ (?̃?𝑡
12 − 𝜋𝑡
12)2) then RPH implies i) perceptions are mean-unbiased 
(i.e. expected perception error is zero 𝐸𝑡[?̃?𝑡
12 − 𝜋𝑡
12] = 0) and ii) perception errors are uncorrelated with any 
element of the information set. This follows without any restrictions on the conditional distribution or 
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information set. Clearly this is very restrictive assumption on the loss function, but one widely used in 
economic modelling. 
Since the information set contains 𝜋𝑡−2
10 , any perception errors in ?̃?𝑡
12 must relate to the 𝜋𝑡−1
1  and 𝜋𝑡
1 
components of 𝜋𝑡
12 ≈ 𝜋𝑡
1 + 𝜋𝑡−1
1 + 𝜋𝑡−2
10 . The 𝜋𝑡−1
1  component is also contained in 𝜋𝑡−1
12  and subject to 
perception error in ?̃?𝑡−1
12  so that perception errors may be correlated at the first lag. However, neither 𝜋𝑡−1
1  
nor 𝜋𝑡
1 are contained in 𝜋𝑡−𝑠
12  ∀𝑠 ≥ 2, so that under RPH perception errors should be uncorrelated at the 
second and longer lags. 
Mean-unbiasedness can be tested parametrically via a Wald test of 𝐻0: 𝛿 = 0 versus 𝐻𝑎: 𝛿 ≠ 0 in the 
regression 
?̃?𝑡
12 − 𝜋𝑡
12 = 𝛿 + 𝜂𝑡 (3) 
  
or via a Wald test of 𝐻0: 𝛼 = 0 & 𝛽 = 1 versus 𝐻𝑎: 𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝐻0 in the traditional rationality regression of Mincer 
and Zarnowitz (Mincer & Zarnowitz, 1969) 
𝜋𝑡
12 = 𝛼 + 𝛽?̃?𝑡
12 + 𝜀𝑡 (4) 
  
where the error terms 𝜂𝑡 and 𝜀𝑡   are MA(1) under 𝐻0 because of the potential serial correlation of perception 
errors at the first lag but not at longer lags, as discussed above.  
The test in (3) is more precise in that 𝛼 = 0 & 𝛽 = 1 in (4) constitutes a sufficient but not necessary condition 
for unbiasedness, which is satisfied more generally by 𝛼 = (1 − 𝛽)𝐸[𝜋𝑡
12] (Holden & Peel, 1990). 
We estimate (4) in addition because it has become standard in the literature and is interpretable as a linear 
approximation to the conditional expectation function of 𝜋𝑡
12 conditional on ?̃?𝑡
12. Note that the parameter 
restrictions on (4) mentioned above only test RPH if 𝜋𝑡
12 and ?̃?𝑡
12 and I(0). If instead they are I(1) and 
cointegrated (tested by a DF-GLS test of the null of a unit root in the residuals) then (4) recovers the 
cointegrating vector asymptotically, so we are effectively testing equality between 𝜋𝑡
12 and ?̃?𝑡
12 in the long-run 
equilibrium, but the dynamics of perception errors as they tend towards that equilibrium are unconstrained 
(apart from the restriction of stationarity). However, if RPH holds then it holds in the long-run equilibrium as 
well, so that a rejection of 𝐻0: 𝛼 = 0 & 𝛽 = 1 would imply rejection of RPH, even though a non-rejection could 
be consistent with RPH. 
We estimate (3) and (4) using OLS (consistent under 𝐻0) both with and without the dummies d93 and dgfk 
introduced in Section 3.5 and label the corresponding parameters 𝜃93 and 𝜃𝑔𝑓𝑘 where the dummies are 
included. Recursive parameter estimates in our parametric regressions (not reported for the sake of space) 
showed no serious instability problems except early in the sample if the d93 dummy was excluded. 
Standard errors should allow for heteroskedasticity, since the null of RPH does not imply homoskedastic 
errors. However, regarding residual serial correlation a subtlety arises. Under the null the residuals are MA(1). 
Therefore to test RPH as a package of assumptions our standard error estimates need only allow for MA(1) 
structure. However, to test unbiasedness separately from the other implications of RPH (such as no residual 
serial correlation) we must allow for unrestricted serial correlation in our standard error estimates. (Indeed 
the residuals exhibit strong autocorrelation at lags longer than 1, and partial autocorrelations are better 
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approximated by AR(1) than MA(1).) In both cases we HAC-robust estimator of Newey and West (1987)8, but in 
the MA(1) (null) case we truncate the kernel after the first lag to obtain more accurate standard error 
estimates and more power to reject the null than in the second case where in the face of a priori unknown 
serial correlation set the truncation lag to the function of sample size suggested by Newey and West (1994)9. 
Zero serial correlation perception errors beyond the first lag can be tested as zero serial correlation beyond 
the first lag in the residuals from (3) and (4) 10, using the method of Bartlett (1946) to estimate significance 
levels on autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation coefficients. 
Finally, a Wald test of 𝛽 = 1 in (4) is interpreted as a test of a necessary condition for information efficiency, 
against the alternative 𝛽 ≠ 1 which implies information inefficiency in the sense that 𝜋𝑡
12 could then be used 
to reduce the variance of the perception error V[?̃?𝑡
12 − 𝜋𝑡
12] = V[𝜂𝑡]11. More intuitively, given the 
interpretation of (4) as a linear approximation to the conditional expectation function of 𝜋𝑡
12 conditional on 
?̃?𝑡
12, 𝛽 = 1 implies that on average ?̃?𝑡
𝑛 tracks the movement in 𝜋𝑡
𝑛, even if the level is subject to a non-zero 
offset. 
                                                          
8
 The covariance matrix estimator of Hansen and Hodrick (1980), originally proposed to deal with overlapping data cases 
like ours, imposes homoscedasticity and is not guaranteed to be positive definite.  
9
 Four lags in samples 1993m1–2007m12 and 1993m1–2001m12, and three lags for 2002m1–2007m1. 
10
 Lein & Maag (2011) and Dräger (2014) consider serial correlation only at the 12
th
 lag. This avoids the challenges of 
overlapping errors, but sacrifices efficiency and power. 
11
 To see this, subtract 𝜋𝑡
12 from both sides of (4), take the variance of both sides, and observe that with 𝛽 ≠ 1 the 
residual variance in the regression V[𝜀𝑡] is smaller than V[𝜂𝑡] (Clements & Hendry, 1998). 
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Table 1: Bias of inflation perceptions, estimated by OLS on equation (3) 
 
Survey measure → Including extreme responses Excluding extreme responses 
Sample → 1993m1–2007m12 1993m1–2001m12 2002m1–2007m12 1993m1–2007m12 1993m1–2001m12 2002m1–2007m12 
Observations,T → 180 108 72 180 108 72 
No dummies       
Constant 𝛿 0.377  0.151  0.716  0.175  0.075  0.326  
 i) (0.112)*** [0.001] (0.164) [0.360] (0.110)*** [0.000] (0.094)* [0.064] (0.137) [0.585] (0.113)*** [0.005] 
 ii) (0.166)** [0.024] (0.245) [0.539] (0.145)*** [0.000] (0.139) [0.208] (0.202) [0.712] (0.148)** [0.031] 
Residual normality *** [0.000] *** [0.000]  [0.720] *** [0.000] *** [0.000]  [0.905] 
Residual ARCH  *** [0.000] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] 
Residual 
autocorrelation  
and partial 
autocorrelation  
Lag AC PAC AC PAC AC PAC AC PAC AC PAC AC PAC 
1 0.880 0.880 0.888 0.888 0.805 0.805 0.874 0.874 0.883 0.883 0.835 0.835 
2 0.775 0.005 0.793 0.020 0.627 -0.061 0.751 -0.056 0.774 -0.030 0.657 -0.134 
3 0.702 0.084 0.718 0.047 0.536 0.142 0.673 0.123 0.690 0.057 0.586 0.255 
With dummies             
Constant 𝛿 0.526  0.526  
As above 
0.370  0.370  
As above 
 i) (0.090)*** [0.000] (0.090)*** [0.000] (0.087)*** [0.000] (0.087)*** [0.000] 
 ii) (0.125)*** [0.000] (0.125)*** [0.000] (0.123)*** [0.003] (0.123)*** [0.003] 
d93 𝜃93 -3.372  -3.372  -2.659  -2.659  
  (0.141)*** [0.000] (0.141)*** [0.000] (0.113)*** [0.000] (0.113)*** [0.000] 
Dgfk 𝜃𝑔𝑓𝑘 0.190    -0.045    
  (0.143) [0.184]   (0.143) [0.754]   
Residual normality  [0.276]  [0.110]  [0.796]  [0.541] 
Residual ARCH  *** [0.000] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] 
Residual 
autocorrelation 
and partial 
autocorrelation 
Lag AC PAC AC PAC AC PAC AC PAC 
1 0.761 0.761 0.724 0.724 0.802 0.802 0.769 0.769 
2 0.600 0.049 0.571 0.098 0.642 -0.003 0.619 0.066 
3 0.485 0.031 0.426 -0.037 0.550 0.101 0.496 0.002 
Notes: Two sets of Newey and West
 
(1987) HAC standard errors reported for parameters to be tested: i) truncating the kernel after first lag, suitable for testing null of unbiasedness jointly with 
MA(1) residual structure implied by RPH; ii) selecting truncation lag based on sample size as per Newey and West
 
(1994), suitable for testing null of unbiasedness independently of residual 
dependence structure (in italics). P-values in brackets [].* indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Null of ‘residual normality’ tested by the omnibus test of Doornik and Hansen 
(2008). Null of no residual ARCH effects at lag 1 tested using Engle’s (1982) LM test. Bold type for AC and PC coefficients indicates magnitude ≥ 2 √𝑇⁄  (equal to 0.149 for T=180 observations, 0.192 
for T=108, 0.236 for T=72) which is an approximate 5% significance level Bartlett (1946).  
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Table 2: Mincer-Zarnowitz regression tests of unbiasedness and no residual serial correlation, using OLS on equation (4) (excluding intervention dummies) 
 
Survey measure → Including extreme responses Excluding extreme responses 
Sample → 1993m1–2007m12 1993m1–2001m12 2002m1–2007m12 1993m1–2007m12 1993m1–2001m12 2002m1–2007m12 
Observations, T → 180 108 72 180 108 72 
Regressor Coef.       
Constant ?̂? -0.312   -0.317  -0.670  -0.936  -0.960  -0.619  
 i) (0.243) [0.200] (0.328) [0.335] (0.341)* [0.053] (0.229)*** [0.000] (0.273)*** [0.001] (0.321)* [0.057] 
 ii) (0.341) [0.361] (0.467) [0.499] (0.420) [0.116] (0.324)*** [0.005] (0.389)** [0.015] (0.403) [0.129] 
Perceptions,  ?̂? 0.966   1.097  0.978  1.453  1.541  1.169  
?̃?𝑡
12 i) (0.114)*** [0.000] (0.185)*** [0.000] (0.159)*** [0.000] (0.154)*** [0.000] (0.197)*** [0.000] (0.178)*** [0.000] 
 ii) (0.156)*** [0.000] (0.261)*** [0.000] (0.189)*** [0.000] (0.223)*** [0.000] (0.289)*** [0.000] (0.216)*** [0.000] 
R2 0.312 0.350 0.386 0.563 0.624 0.384 
Wald tests        
Mean-unbiasedness: 5.72*** [0.004] 0.68 [0.511] 21.04*** [0.000] 11.97*** [0.000] 7.12*** [0.001] 4.93** [0.010] 
?̂? = 0 & ?̂? = 1 F(2,T-2)
 2.61* [0.076] 0.32 [0.731] 12.07*** [0.000] 6.34*** [0.002] 3.82** [0.025] 2.76* [0.070] 
Tracks movements: 0.09 [0.764] 0.28 [0.601] 0.02 [0.892] 8.71*** [0.004] 7.54*** [0.007] 0.90 [0.345] 
?̂? = 1 F(1,T-1) 0.05 [0.825] 0.14 [0.711] 0.01 [0.910] 4.14** [0.043] 3.50* [0.064] 0.61 [0.438] 
Residual normality *** [0.000] *** [0.000] [0.727] *** [0.001] ** [0.024] [0.922] 
Residual ARCH *** [0.000] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] 
Residual 
autocorrelation 
and partial 
autocorrelation  
Lag AC PAC AC PAC AC PAC AC PAC AC PAC AC PAC 
1 0.882 0.882 0.880 0.880 0.807 0.807 0.823 0.823 0.815 0.815 0.824 0.824 
2 0.779 0.002 0.781 0.026 0.629 -0.064 0.662 -0.048 0.653 -0.035 0.640 -0.119 
3 0.706 0.084 0.702 0.044 0.538 0.141 0.573 0.128 0.537 0.045 0.578 0.271 
Notes: see notes to Table 1.  
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Table 3: Mincer-Zarnowitz regression tests of unbiasedness and no residual serial correlation, using OLS on equation (4) (including intervention dummies) 
 
Survey measure → Including extreme responses Excluding extreme responses 
Sample → 1993m1–2007m12 1993m1–2001m12 2002m1–2007m12 1993m1–2007m12 1993m1–2001m12 2002m1–2007m12 
Observations, T → 180 108 72 180 108 72 
Regressor Coef.       
Constant ?̂? -0.520   -0.530  -0.670  -0.640  -0.643  -0.619  
 i) (0.190)*** [0.007] (0.225)** [0.020] (0.341)* [0.053] (0.181)*** [0.001] (0.208)*** [0.003] (0.321)* [0.057] 
 ii) (0.260)** [0.047] (0.311)* [0.092] (0.420) [0.116] (0.240)** [0.011] (0.289)** [0.028] (0.403) [0.129] 
Perceptions,  ?̂? 0.997   1.002  0.978  1.176  1.177  1.169  
 i) (0.103)*** [0.000] (0.127)*** [0.000] (0.159)*** [0.000] (0.103)*** [0.000] (0.123)*** [0.000] (0.178)*** [0.000] 
?̃?𝑡
12 ii) (0.141)*** [0.000] (0.261)*** [0.000] (0.189)*** [0.000] (0.144)*** [0.000] (0.173)*** [0.000] (0.216)*** [0.000] 
d93 𝜃93 3.373***  (0.103) 3.372*** (0.146)   2.499*** (0.149) 2.498*** (0.206)   
   [0.000]  [0.000]    [0.000]  [0.000]   
Dgfk 𝜃𝑔𝑓𝑘 -0.189  (0.151)     0.008 (0.140)     
   [0.377]      [0.952]     
R2 0.748 0.827 0.386 0.768 0.852 0.384 
Wald tests        
Mean-unbiasedness: 16.94*** [0.000] 16.92*** [0.000] 21.04*** [0.000] 10.99*** [0.000] 10.56*** [0.000] 4.93** [0.010] 
?̂? = 0 & ?̂? = 1 F(2,T-2)
 8.78*** [0.000] 8.78*** [0.000] 12.07*** [0.000] 6.01*** [0.003] 5.76*** [0.004] 2.76* [0.070] 
Tracks movements: 0.00 [0.975] 0.00 [0.985] 0.02 [0.892] 2.90* [0.091] 2.09 [0.151] 0.90 [0.345] 
?̂? = 1 F(1,T-1) 0.00 [0.982] 0.00 [0.989] 0.01 [0.910] 1.49 [0.224] 1.05 [0.308] 0.61 [0.438] 
Residual normality [0.279] [0.110] [0.727] [0.825] [0.610] [0.922] 
Residual ARCH *** [0.000] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] 
Residual 
autocorrelation 
and partial 
autocorrelation  
Lag AC PAC AC PAC AC PAC AC PAC AC PAC AC PAC 
1 0.762 0.762 0.723 0.723 0.807 0.807 0.769 0.769 0.719 0.719 0.824 0.824 
2 0.601 0.050 0.570 0.097 0.629 -0.064 0.584 -0.018 0.530 0.026 0.640 -0.119 
3 0.486 0.031 0.424 -0.038 0.538 0.141 0.483 0.099 0.383 -0.013 0.578 0.271 
Notes: see notes to Table 1. 
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The point estimates ?̂? of perceptions mean-bias in Table 1 are positive and substantial (ranging 
between 0.33 and 0.72 percentage points, cf. an inflation target of 2%) across both perception 
measures. When the d93 dummy is included the bias is significant at the 1% level across all samples. 
Essentially the same pattern of results is seen in the mean-unbiasedness tests in the Mincer-
Zarnowitz regressions in Table 2 and Table 3, which relax the restriction implicit in Table 1 that 𝛽 =
1. 
However, the significance of the bias is not robust to the exclusion of the d93 dummy, which is a 
potential concern because this was included for statistical rather than persuasive institutional 
reasons. It is therefore reassuring that the nonparametric tests in Section 4.3 reject median-
unbiasedness at the 5% level even including 1993 and no analogue to d93. This is also consistent 
with mean-unbiasedness if the conditional distribution of inflation is symmetric – an assumption 
with which the non-rejection of normality tests is consistent. The dgfk dummy is insignificant but the 
point estimate is non-trivial and we retain this dummy as a precaution. 
Information efficiency in the sense of no residual autocorrelation beyond the first lag is roundly 
rejected by the autocorrelation coefficients (AC) in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3. These show 
significant autocorrelation up to at least the 4th lag (reporting truncated at the 3rd lag in the Tables 
for the sake of space) and in most cases up the 6th or 7th lag. Including dummies d93 and dgfk only 
slightly attenuates the residual autocorrelation, and combined with the relative parameter stability 
this makes it seem unlikely that the residual autocorrelation is spuriously driven by un-modelled 
structural breaks. 
Our looser sense of information efficiency 𝛽 = 1 is also rejected when extreme responses are 
excluded, but not when they are included, in which case the point estimate ?̂? close to 1. 
The R2 values are smaller than might be expected under RPH given that 10 or 11 of the 12 months of 
inflation data is already publicly available, so that perception errors should only relate to the 
inflation component in the final one or two months out of 12. (The apparently impressive R2>0.8 in 
Table 3 is in considerable part due to the d93 dummy.)  
If 𝜋𝑡
12 and ?̃?𝑡
12 are I(1) and cointegrated then our estimates of (4) can be interpreted as a linear 
approximation to the long-run equilibrium, as discussed above. The DF-GLS test of Elliott, 
Rothenberg, & Stock (1996) – with lag length of one selected by information criteria, no 
deterministic trend, and d93 and dgfk dummies included – rejects the null of a unit root in the 
residuals at the 95% level  for the perceptions measure including extreme responses  (test statistic 
equal to -3.610 vs. critical value -1.950) and at the 90% level for the perceptions measure excluding 
extreme responses (test statistic equal to -1.857  vs. critical value -1.615). This is evidence that if 𝜋𝑡
12 
and ?̃?𝑡
12 are I(1) then they are also cointegrated. We thus conclude that if the data is I(1) then the 
bias estimated above persists even in the long-run. 
Finally, notice the strong evidence of residual heteroskedasticity the parametric regression results. 
While OLS point estimates and Newey-West standard errors are asymptotically consistent in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity (or non-normality), they are not efficient and may not perform well in 
finite samples. This provides one motivation for the non-parametric tests in Section 4.3. 
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4.3 Mean absolute error (MAE) loss 
Similar to the MSE case above, if the loss function is of MAE form (i.e. 𝐿 ∝ |?̃?𝑡
12 − 𝜋𝑡
12|) then RPH 
implies i) perceptions are median-unbiased (i.e. perception errors have zero mean) and ii) 
perception errors are uncorrelated with any element of the information set. This follows without any 
restrictions on the conditional distribution or information set. 
As in Section 4.2, given the maintained assumption on the information set, ii) implies that that 
perception errors may be serially correlated at the first lag but not at longer lags. 
We follow Campbell & Ghysels (1995) in applying non-parametric tests for i) and ii). These are exact 
in the presence of non-normality and heteroskedasticity. They are more robust to potential finite 
sample problems, including outliers, than regression-based tests. Parametric tests could also be 
conducted using quantile regression, but would be less robust. 
Note that, in the special case where the conditional distribution of inflation is symmetric, then under 
MSE (or indeed any symmetric loss function) the optimal distribution of perception errors is 
symmetric (as can be easily seen by symmetry arguments) so that the mean and median coincide. In 
this case the test rejections and the parametric estimates of the bias in Section 4.2 can also be 
interpreted as applicable under MAE loss. Also the tests in this Section can be interpreted as 
applicable under MSE loss in which case they are more robust and potentially more efficient tests of 
RPH under MSE loss.  
The null that perception errors have zero median and are uncorrelated beyond the first lag can be 
tested using statistics, 𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑑 and 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛, defined as 
𝑆𝑖 = ∑ 𝑢(?̃?𝑡
12 − 𝜋𝑡
12)
𝑡∈𝑇𝑖
, 𝑖 = {𝑜𝑑𝑑, 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛} 
𝑢(𝑧) = 1, if 𝑧 ≥ 0 
= 0, if 𝑧 < 0 
𝑇𝑜𝑑𝑑 = {1, 3, 5, … }, 𝑇𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 = {2,4, 6, … } 
(5) 
  
are each binomially distributed with number of trials equal to the cardinality of 𝑇𝑜𝑑𝑑 and 𝑇𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 and 
probability of success 0.5. We reject the null at significance level α if either 𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑑 or 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 is 
significant at the α 2⁄  level. The odd/even split ensures that, under the null, the observations 
involved in 𝑆𝑖 are uncorrelated, which is assumed in calculating critical values. 
Under the additional assumption that perception errors are symmetric about zero (which could arise 
from both loss function and DGP being symmetric, or from particular combinations of asymmetric 
loss function and asymmetric DGP) 𝑊𝑜𝑑𝑑  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑊𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛, defined as 
𝑊𝑖 = ∑ 𝑢(?̃?𝑡
12 − 𝜋𝑡
12) ∙ 𝑅1,𝑡
+
𝑡∈𝑇𝑖
 
𝑅1,𝑡
+ = ∑ 𝑢
𝑠∈𝑇𝑖
(|?̃?𝑡
12 − 𝜋𝑡
12| − |?̃?𝑠
12 − 𝜋𝑠
12|) 
𝑖 ∈ {𝑜𝑑𝑑, 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛} 
(6) 
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(with 𝑢(∙),  𝑇𝑜𝑑𝑑 and  𝑇𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 defined as before) are each distributed as Wilcoxon (1945) signed rank
12. 
We reject the null at significance level α if either 𝑊𝑜𝑑𝑑 or 𝑊𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 is exceeds the critical value for α 2⁄ . 
Critical values and p-values are obtained from the normal approximation with continuity correction, 
as implemented in Stata’s -signrank- command. 
There is no straightforward analogue to the dummies used in the regression tests. In place of d93 we 
report results for subsamples starting in 1994m1. Instead of dgfk we examine subsamples where this 
is zero and one respectively. 
The null of no serial correlation in perception errors at given lag 𝑙 can be tested using nonparametric 
sign and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests due to Dufour (1981) under the maintained hypothesis that 
forecast errors are median-unbiased: 
𝑆𝐶𝑙 = ∑ 𝑢 ((?̃?𝑡
12 − 𝜋𝑡
12) ∙ (?̃?𝑡−𝑙
12 − 𝜋𝑡−𝑙
12 ))
𝑇
𝑡=𝑙+1
   (7) 
  
and 
𝑊𝐶𝑙 = ∑ 𝑢 ((?̃?𝑡
12 − 𝜋𝑡
12) ∙ (?̃?𝑡−𝑙
12 − 𝜋𝑡−𝑙
12 )) ∙ 𝑅2,𝑡
+
𝑇
𝑡=𝑙+1
 
𝑅2,𝑡
+ = ∑ 𝑢
𝑇
𝑡=𝑙+1
(|?̃?𝑡
12 − 𝜋𝑡
12| ∙ |?̃?𝑠
12 − 𝜋𝑠
12|) 
(8) 
  
Under the null of no residual serial correlation at lag 𝑙, SC𝑙 is binomially distributed with number of 
trials equal to 𝑇 and probability of success 0.5; WC𝑙 is distributed as Wilcoxon signed-rank. 
The null is strongly rejected in all cases, except for a marginal non-rejection of median-zero 
perception errors for the 1993m1-2001m12 subsample excluding extreme responses. We conclude 
that the median bias is non-zero, perception errors are serially correlated and we reject RPH for MAE 
loss functions.
                                                          
12
 Note that for tied observations 𝑅1,𝑡
+  assigns the highest rank associated with each tie. Dufour (1981) 
acknowledges that using the average rank would be more natural but does not implement this for reasons of 
computational convenience that are no longer a material concern. We use the Stata implementation in the 
command -signrank- that assigns average ranks to ties. The difference is negligible in continuous data like ours 
where true ties occur with probability zero. 
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Table 4: Non-parametric sign and signed-rank tests of unbiasedness and no residual serial correlation in inflation perceptions 
 
Survey 
measure 
→ Including extreme responses Excluding extreme responses 
Sample → 1993m1–
2007m12 
1993m1–
2001m12 
2002m1–
2007m12 
1994m1–
2007m12 
1994m1–
2001m12 
1993m1–
2007m12 
1993m1–
2001m12 
2002m1–
2007m12 
1994m1–
2007m12 
1994m1–
2001m12 
Observations, 
T 
→ 180 108 72 168 96 180 108 72 168 96 
Unbiasedness S𝑖 W𝑖 S𝑖 W𝑖 S𝑖 W𝑖 S𝑖 W𝑖 S𝑖 W𝑖  S𝑖 W𝑖 S𝑖 W𝑖 S𝑖 W𝑖 S𝑖 W𝑖 S𝑖 W𝑖 
𝑖 = 𝑜𝑑𝑑 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.015 0.004 0.220 0.103 0.029 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.029 0.000 
𝑖 = 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.220 0.154 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.001 
Joint signif. *** *** ** ** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***   *** *** *** *** ** *** 
Residual serial 
correlation  SC𝑙 WC𝑙 SC𝑙 WC𝑙 SC𝑙 WC𝑙 SC𝑙 WC𝑙 SC𝑙 WC𝑙 SC𝑙 WC𝑙 SC𝑙 WC𝑙 SC𝑙 WC𝑙 SC𝑙 WC𝑙 SC𝑙 WC𝑙 
Lag, 𝑙 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.004 
6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.125 0.005 
Notes: S𝑖 , W𝑖 , SC𝑙 , WC𝑙  are defined in equations (5), (6), (7), (8) respectively. p-values (computed using the normal approximation with continuity correction) are reported for probability that 
test statistics are drawn from distribution implied by the null. * indicates acceptance of the null of median-unbiasedness at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. p-values of SC𝑙 and WC𝑙 below the 
1% significance threshold are highlighted in bold. 
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4.4 Unknown loss function 
Of course empirically the loss function is unknown in our context and if it departs from MSE or MAE 
forms then except in special cases we require restrictions on the conditional distribution of the 
target variable (here inflation) to obtain testable properties of the perception errors. 
By restricting the conditional distribution we are implicitly invoking a particular information set. 
However, testing can still be conducted without access to or use of that information set. Rather the 
interpretation of accepting or rejecting the test of properties is predicated on the restrictions on the 
distribution conditional on the particular information set, whatever the conditioning information set 
happens to be. 
As noted above, if we restrict the conditional distribution to be symmetric around its mean then we 
can relax the restriction on the loss function to simply require symmetry and again obtain the 
implication of mean zero perception errors. 
However, symmetric loss functions such as MSE and MAE arguably do not provide the most plausible 
description of many aspects of consumer behaviour  (Granger & Newbold, 1986, p. 125; Zellner, 
1986), particularly where there may be loss aversion, which implies a loss function that is 
asymmetric around zero. While it may not be clear what a ‘loss’ is with regard to consumer inflation 
perceptions13, it is clear that imposing symmetry is restrictive and could be responsible for spurious 
rejections of RPH if incorrect. 
Patton & Timmerman (Patton & Timmermann, 2007) (PT from hereon) show how to trade off 
restrictions on the loss function against restrictions on the data-generating process to obtain 
testable properties of perception errors under more general classes of loss functions, including many 
asymmetric loss functions.  
If dynamics in the distribution of inflation are restricted to the mean, and the loss function is solely a 
function of forecast error (but subject to no other restrictions) then, as in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, RPH 
implies that perception errors are orthogonal to the information set and thus exhibit no residual 
serial correlation beyond the first lag. Hence we can extend the interpretation of the above tests of 
this property. Restricting inflation dynamics to the mean looks implausible against historical data in 
the long run, but it might reasonably approximate inflation dynamics over shorter spans. 
If the restrictions on the DGP are weakened to allow dynamics in the conditional variance of 
inflation, and the restrictions on the loss function are tightened to require a homogeneous function, 
then PT shows that i) the rational perception is equal to the same quantile of the inflation 
distribution in every period, and ii) an indicator variable 𝐼𝑡  for positive perception error (i.e. 𝐼𝑡 = 1 if 
?̃?𝑡
12 − 𝜋𝑡
12 > 0 and zero otherwise) is distributed independently of elements in the information set. 
                                                          
13
 Idiosyncratic features of individuals’ loss functions might motivate asymmetric loss. For example, inflation 
below expectations implies a higher real-terms value of debt stock, which translates into a real-terms gain, 
relative to expectations, for net creditors but a real-terms loss for net debtors. If we suppose these 
idiosyncrasies ‘average out‘ in the representative mean perception captured by our data, then macroeconomic 
non-linearities (e.g. the risk of deflationary and hyperinflationary spirals) and social norms might motivate 
asymmetry. 
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These properties are also implied by the pair of assumptions above (dynamics restriction to the 
mean and loss function solely a function or forecast error).  
Remarkably these properties can be tested by parameter restrictions 𝐻0: 𝜷 = 𝟎 ∀𝑖 vs 𝐻𝑎: Not 𝐻0 in 
the simple regression: 
𝑔(𝐼𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝜷
′𝒁𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 (9) 
  
where 𝑔(∙) is alternately the identity function (in which case estimation is by OLS) or, reflecting that 
𝐼𝑡 is binary, the inverse logit function
14 (in which cases estimation is by MLE, and 𝜂𝑡 is modelled as 
binomially distributed), and the vector 𝒁𝑡 represents a subset of the information set. The only 
restriction on the error term 𝜂𝑡 is that it is mean zero, hence we employ Newey-West HAC-robust 
standard errors using the lag selection algorithm of Newey and West (1994). 
We follow PT in testing on parsimonious subsets of 𝒁𝑡. The first is exactly as per the empirical 
example in their Section 2.3: 𝒁𝑡 = {?̃?𝑡
12}. Results are shown in Table 5 and Table 6. ?̂?1 is small and 
insignificant so we fail to reject the RPH in this case. However, if we add the sign of the perception 
error two periods ago (rather than one period ago , which is observable by period 𝑡, to get 
𝒁𝑡 = {?̃?𝑡
12, 𝐼𝑡−2} (where we use 𝐼𝑡−2 rather than 𝐼𝑡−1 as used by PT because our maintained 
assumption on the information set does not guarantee that it contains 𝐼𝑡−1) then ?̂?2 is significant 
and RPH is strongly rejected, as seen in Table 7 and Table 8. This rejection is robust to all of linear, 
logit and probit15 regression, and of course there are many other covariates we could have tried 
which may also have given a rejection of RPH. Note that the endogeneity of the lagged dependent 
variable in the presence of MA(1) errors anticipated under the null, will bias parameter estimates in 
general, but not under 𝐻0, so rejections of 𝐻0 are not compromised. 
Finally, PT proves that the loss function and DGP restrictions they impose are maximally general in 
the following sense. If the loss function is non-homogeneous then allowing for conditional variance 
dynamics makes it difficult to obtain testable restrictions that are robust to the loss function. If there 
are dynamics in higher moments of the DGP then more information on the shape of the loss function 
is required to obtain testable restrictions, even if the distribution of the forecast error is known.
                                                          
14
 The probit model gave very similar results to the logit model so is not reported for the sake of space. 
15
 Results not reported since they were very similar to logit results. 
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Table 5: Quantile tests for forecast optimality of inflation perceptions in Sweden, based on equation (9) with 𝒁𝑡 = {?̃?𝑡
12} (excluding intervention dummies) 
 
Survey measure → Including extreme responses Excluding extreme responses 
Sample → 1993m1–2007m12 1993m1–2001m12 2002m1–2007m12 1993m1–2007m12 1993m1–2001m12 2002m1–2007m12 
Observations, T → 180 108 72 180 108 72 
HAC kernel lags  22 12 11 22 11 11 
Linear regression (OLS)       
Constant ?̂? 0.759*** (0.136) 0.785*** (0.192) 0.787** (0.314) 0.901*** (0.153) 0.927*** (0.200) 0.689* (0.367) 
   [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.015]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.065] 
Perceptions,  ?̂?1 -0.014 (0.055) -0.075 (0.114) 0.028 (0.123) -0.153 (0.096) -0.204 (0.139) 0.019 (0.167) 
?̃?𝑡
12   [0.804]  [0.516]  [0.821]  [0.112]  [0.145]  [0.908] 
Link test (p-val)  * [0.063] *** [0.000] [0.745] [0.371] [0.142] [0.623] 
Logit regression (MLE)       
Constant ?̂? 1.142* (0.706) 1.221 (0.889) 1.250 (2.278) 1.771** (0.781) 1.878* (1.045) 0.787 (1.777) 
   [0.106]  [0.170]  [0.583]  [0.023]  [0.072]  [0.658] 
Perceptions,  ?̂?1 -0.069 (0.278) -0.326 (0.494) 0.220 (0.925) -0.684 (0.444) -0.897 (0.676) 0.097 (0.817) 
?̃?𝑡
12   [0.803]  [0.509]  [0.812]  [0.123]  [0.185]  [0.906] 
Link test (p-val)  * [0.065] * [0.036] [0.727] [0.244] [0.137] [0.635] 
Notes: Newey-West standard errors reported. ‘HAC kernel lag’ is the truncation lag selected according to Newey and West (1994). The misspecification ‘link test’ of Pregibon (1979) is a test of the null 
that the square of the fitted values of the index (the right-hand side of equation (9)) is insignificant in a subsequent regression of 𝑔(𝐼𝑡−2
12 ) on a constant, those fitted values and their square. 
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Table 6: Quantile tests for forecast optimality of inflation perceptions in Sweden, based on on equation (9) with 𝒁𝑡 = {?̃?𝑡
12} (including intervention dummies) 
 
Survey measure → Including extreme responses Excluding extreme responses 
Sample → 1993m1–2007m12 1993m1–2001m12 2002m1–2007m12 1993m1–2007m12 1993m1–2001m12 2002m1–2007m12 
Observations, T → 180 108 72 180 108 72 
HAC kernel lag  5 20 11 6 20 11 
Linear regression (OLS)       
Constant ?̂? 0.798*** (0.114) 0.831*** (0.137) 0.787** (0.314) 0.809 (0.152) 0.856*** (0.147) 0.689* (0.367) 
   [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.015]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.065] 
Perceptions,  ?̂?1 -0.034 (0.066) -0.054 (0.087) 0.028 (0.123) -0.092 (0.101) -0.123 (0.106) 0.019 (0.167) 
?̃?𝑡
12   [0.600]  [0.534]  [0.821]  [0.360]  [0.247]  [0.908] 
Link test (p-val)  [0.994] [0.865] [0.745] [0.893] [0.748] [0.623] 
Logit regression (MLE)       
Constant ?̂? 1.378** (0.651) 1.525** (0.736) 1.250 (2.278) 1.366* (0.755) 1.584** (0.743) 0.787 (1.777) 
   [0.034]  [0.038]  [0.583]  [0.070]  [0.033]  [0.658] 
Perceptions,  ?̂?1 -0.194 (0.359) -0.277 (0.421) 0.220 (0.925) -0.428 (0.462) -0.563 (0.484) 0.097 (0.817) 
?̃?𝑡
12   [0.590]  [0.511]  [0.812]  [0.355]  [0.245]  [0.906] 
Link test (p-val)  [0.872] [0.733] [0.727] [0.647] [0.498] [0.635] 
Notes: parameter estimates on dummies not reported. See also notes to Table 6. 
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Table 7: Quantile tests for forecast optimality of inflation perceptions in Sweden, based on equation (9) with 𝒁𝑡 = {?̃?𝑡
12, 𝐼𝑡−2} (excluding intervention dummies) 
 
Survey measure → Including extreme responses Excluding extreme responses 
Sample → 1993m1–2007m12 1993m1–2001m12 2002m1–2007m12 1993m1–2007m12 1993m1–2001m12 2002m1–2007m12 
Observations, T → 178 106 72 178 106 72 
HAC kernel lags  22 13 8 22 3 11 
Linear regression (OLS)       
Constant ?̂? 0.405*** (0.150) 0.462** (0.186) 0.407 (0.368) 0.415*** (0.135) 0.352** (0.178) 0.419 (0.374) 
   [0.008]  [0.015]  [0.272]  [0.002]  [0.050]  [0.266] 
Perceptions,  ?̂?1 0.025 (0.040) -0.017 (0.073) 0.060 (0.114) -0.030 (0.065) -0.045 (0.081) 0.069 (0.154) 
?̃?𝑡
12   [0.539]  [0.818]  [0.601]  [0.639]  [0.582]  [0.655] 
LDV, 𝐼𝑡−2 ?̂?2 0.390*** (0.113) 0.353** (0.150) 0.369** (0.176) 0.441*** (0.082) 0.536*** (0.110) 0.253 (0.165) 
   [0.001]  [0.020]  [0.039]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.129] 
Residual serial corr. (p-val) *** [0.001] ** [0.014] *** [0.008] *** [0.000] *** [0.001] *** [0.008] 
Link test (p-val)  [0.712] [0.860] ** [0.019] [0.830] [0.415] *[0.054] 
Wald test of ?̂? = 𝟎 (p-val) *** [0.003] * [0.066] [0.101] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] [0.313] 
Logit regression (MLE)       
Constant ?̂? -0.514 (0.764) -0.108 (0.872) -1.046 (2.536) -0.260 (0.713) -0.499 (0.969) -0.497 (1.753) 
   [0.501]  [0.902]  [0.680]  [0.716]  [0.607]  [0.777] 
Perceptions,  ?̂?1 0.164 (0.263) -0.090 (0.380) 0.534 (0.985) -0.171 (0.359) -0.269 (0.464) 0.369 (0.777) 
?̃?𝑡
12   [0.533]  [0.812]  [0.588]  [0.633]  [0.563]  [0.635] 
LDV, 𝐼𝑡−2 ?̂?2 1.889*** (0.510) 1.568** (0.647) 2.715** (0.891) 1.972*** (0.400) 2.445*** (0.587) 1.201 (0.736) 
   [0.000]  [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.103] 
Link test (p-val)  [0.838] [0.919] * [0.069] [0.795] [0.560] ** [0.023] 
Wald test of ?̂? = 𝟎 (p-val) *** [0.001] * [0.052] ** [0.027] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] [0.264] 
Notes: The residual serial correlation test has the null of no residual series correlation at up to 12 lags. ‘Residual serial corr.’ is the Cumby and Huizinga (1992) test of null of no residual serial 
correlation at up to 12 lags, allowing for endogenous explanatory variables and heteroskedastic errors. The misspecification ‘link test’ of Pregibon (1979) is a test of the null that the square of the fitted 
values of the index (the right-hand side of equation (9)) is insignificant in a subsequent regression of 𝑔(𝐼𝑡−2) on a constant, those fitted values and their square. 
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Table 8: Quantile tests for forecast optimality of inflation perceptions in Sweden, based on equation (9) with 𝒁𝑡 = {?̃?𝑡
12, 𝐼𝑡−2} (including intervention dummies) 
 
Survey measure → Including extreme responses Excluding extreme responses 
Sample → 1993m1–2007m12 1993m1–2001m12 2002m1–2007m12 1993m1–2007m12 1993m1–2001m12 2002m1–2007m12 
Observations, T → 178 106 72 178 106 72 
HAC kernel lags  17 18 8 17 20 11 
Linear regression (OLS)       
Constant ?̂? 0.571*** (0.156) 0.666*** (0.165) 0.407 (0.368) 0.434*** (0.153) 0.387** (0.170) 0.419 (0.374) 
   [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.272]  [0.005]  [0.024]  [0.266] 
Perceptions,  ?̂?1 -0.006 (0.052) -0.032 (0.071) 0.060 (0.114) -0.013 (0.071) -0.023 (0.082) 0.069 (0.154) 
?̃?𝑡
12   [0.907]  [0.650]  [0.601]  [0.854]  [0.781]  [0.655] 
LDV, 𝐼𝑡−2 ?̂?2 0.242** (0.115) 0.172 (0.139) 0.369** (0.176) 0.379*** (0.087) 0.471 (0.079) 0.253 (0.165) 
   [0.036]  [0.216]  [0.039]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.129] 
Residual serial corr. (p-val) *** [0.000] ** [0.013] *** [0.008] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] *** [0.008] 
Link test (p-val)  [0.921] [0.983] ** [0.019] [0.870] [0.958] *[0.054] 
Wald test of ?̂? = 𝟎 (p-val) * [0.099] [0.455] [0.101] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] [0.313] 
Logit regression (MLE)       
Constant ?̂? 0.239 (0.802) 0.770 (0.788) -1.046 (2.536) -0.260 (0.772) -0.385 (0.922) -0.497 (1.753) 
   [0.765]  [0.329]  [0.680]  [0.737]  [0.676]  [0.777] 
Perceptions,  ?̂?1 -0.031 (0.317) -0.176 (0.367) 0.534 (0.985) -0.068 (0.378) -0.137 (0.468) 0.369 (0.777) 
?̃?𝑡
12   [0.922]  [0.632]  [0.588]  [0.858]  [0.770]  [0.635] 
LDV, 𝐼𝑡−2 ?̂?2 1.250** (0.523) 0.828 (0.577) 2.715** (0.891) 1.725*** (0.407) 2.145*** (0.354) 1.201 (0.736) 
   [0.017]  [0.151]  [0.015]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.103] 
Link test (p-val)  [0.187] [0.784] * [0.069] [0.309] [0.690] ** [0.023] 
Wald test of ?̂? = 𝟎 (p-val) ** [0.050] [0.349] ** [0.027] *** [0.000] *** [0.000] [0.264] 
Note: parameter estimates on dummies not reported. See also notes to Table 7. 
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5 Conclusions 
Overall there is statistically significant evidence of both mean and median bias. The point estimates 
of the mean bias – on the order of +½ a percentage point – are substantial compared to relevant 
benchmarks including the inflation target of 2%±1%, the root mean-squared perception error 
of1.09%, and then mean and standard deviation of inflation at 1.50% and 1.32% respectively. Thus 
the bias is also economically significant. If inflation is I(1) then the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression can 
also be interpreted as showing that this biased persists even in the long-run equilibrium between 
inflation and perceptions. 
This robust bias finding is a new result for Sweden as far as we are aware. It is consistent with 
findings on US quantitative data (M. F. Bryan & Venkatu, 2001a, 2001b), but contrary to Lein and 
Maag (2011) which estimates a bias of 0.01% on the 1996m1-2007m8 subsample of our dataset. It is 
unclear how they get this result since both formally and even by eye from Figure 1 there is 
substantial positive bias over this period. As in the present paper, Dräger (2014) rejected median-
unbiasedness using the Wilcoxon rank test, but she only considered a subsample of our dataset, 
1998m1-2007m12, assumed symmetrically distributed perception errors (which our sign test does 
not) and did not test mean-unbiasedness. 
On an earlier sample, 1978-1985, Jonung and Laidler (1988) did not reject mean-unbiasedness. 
However, their point estimate of bias in the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression is larger than ours and the 
non-rejection may be the result of low power due to a shorter and lower frequency sample than 
ours. Applying the sign test to their data we reject the null of median-unbiasedness with a p-value of 
0.000916, which illustrates the added value of the nonparametric tests compared to the parametric 
tests. 
By contrast, our finding of strong and significant serial correlation in perception errors beyond the 
first lag is consistent with the aforementioned Swedish literature. 
The above results imply rejection of RPH under MSE and MAE loss, confirming the finding of earlier 
literature on earlier samples and subsamples of this Swedish dataset. However, our rejection of RPH 
under the more general combinations of restrictions on the (unknown) loss function and DGP 
covered by the indicator test of Patton and Timmermann (Patton & Timmermann, 2007) is new in 
the literature as far as we are aware. The combinations covered by this rejection include any loss 
function that is solely a function of perception error in combination with any inflation dynamics are 
limited to the conditional mean and variance. 
Of course it is possible that there are dynamics in higher moments of inflation and/or that the loss 
function depends on variables other than perception error (e.g. the level of inflation). For example, 
non-linearities in the DGP when inflation is close to zero or very high (and thus at greater risk of a 
deflationary or hyperinflationary spiral, though this is unlikely to have been a major issue in our 
sample) might induce conditional skew dynamics. Similarly, the loss from under-predicting inflation 
                                                          
16
 The raw data in their Chart I shows that perception errors were positive in 4 out of their 25 observations, 
and the positive errors were similar in magnitude to the negative errors. The sign statistic 𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑑 + 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 
(appropriate under the null of zero median and independent, rather than MA(1), errors) is distributed as 
Binomial(25, 0.5) under the null, so the two-sided p-value for 4 ‘successes’ is 0.0009. 
January 2015 Peter Eckley 26 
may be greater when inflation is high and threatening to de-anchor from the official target, and the 
loss from over-predicting inflation may be greater when it is low and deflation threatens. From a 
consumer perspective the loss could be micro-founded in terms of the opportunity cost of failing to 
take appropriate action to optimise real income, real balance sheet position, or to insure against 
indirect effects such as loss of employment that may become more probable when inflation is far 
from target. 
The other maintained assumptions might alternatively explain our rejections of RPH without having 
to reject the assumption of fully optimising behaviour. 
Statistical learning rules relax the assumption that the consumer knows the data generating process 
a priori (see Evans & Honkapohja, 2001 for an overview). This seems unlikely to offer a complete 
explanation since the rate of learning would have to be very slow to for bias to persist in our 15-year 
span of data during which there does not appear to have been a major regime shift. 
Relaxing the assumption that the reference index is CPI for all consumers offers a perhaps more 
plausible route to rationalising perceptions. For example, consumer inflation perceptions may be 
disproportionately affected by the prices of particularly salient or frequently purchased goods such 
as petrol, bread and milk (e.g. Brachinger, 2008; Curto Millet, 2006; Ehrmann, 2006). Some recent 
evidence is consistent with this. Curto Millet (2006) was able to rationalise a subsample of our 
perceptions data in the long-run equilibrium of a cointegrated VECM by allowing different weights 
on 12 sub-indices of CPI inflation. Eckley (2009) found seasonality in inflation perceptions that is not 
present in actual inflation. This might be rationalised by seasonally varying consumption patterns. 
The empirical challenge ahead lies in testing RPH under further relaxation of the assumptions on the 
reference index, information set, conditional distribution and prior set of loss functions, to establish 
what combinations of assumptions (if any) can rationalise consumer inflation perceptions. Extending 
tests of RPH to the plausible DGP/loss function combinations mentioned above, using the flexible 
spline approximation to the loss function proposed by Patton & Timmermann (2007), could be one 
next step. 
Whether or not perceptions are fully rationalisable, they at least partially incorporate the available 
information as reflected in ?̂? close to unity in the Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions and the fact that 
root-mean square error (RMSE) of inflation perceptions (0.679 percentage points) is substantially 
smaller than RMSE of 12-month ahead inflation expectations from the same survey and period 
(1.143 percentage points)17. 
6 Implications 
Our findings have important implications for wider theoretical and empirical work in at least three 
areas. 
6.1 Evaluating theory models of inflation perceptions and expectations 
A positive bias is inconsistent with the near-rationality hypothesis of Akerlof, Dickens, & Perry (2000) 
applied to inflation perceptions considered as nowcasts. One version of their model predicts that 
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 We exclude 1993 from this comparison for the same reason that we dummy 1993 in our regressions. 
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members of the labour force have rational expectations (and thus implicitly rational perceptions). 
The other version predicts that the only systematic expectation errors members of the labour force18 
would make are negative. This adds support to the finding of Bryan & Palmqvist (2005) of little 
support for near-rationality on forward-looking expectations from the same survey. 
The finding of bias even in the long-run equilibrium (assuming inflation is I(1) and cointegrated with 
perceptions) is further inconsistent with several popular models that seek to rationalise REH/RPH 
violations by relaxing one or two of the bundled assumptions, but that still that perceptions tend to 
equality with inflation in the long-run. These include rational inattention (Reis, 2006; Sims, 2003); 
sticky information (Mankiw & Reis, 2002); and the epidemiological model of Carroll (2003). 
6.2 Macroeconomic modelling 
Consumer inflation perceptions play a major role in most contemporary macroeconomic models via 
their involvement in decisions about durables purchases, saving, debt management and wage 
negotiations. It is assumed that agents observe nominal variables but care about real variables, and 
adjust between the two using perceived inflation. Perception errors are typically assumed (usually 
implicitly) to be deterministically zero or if stochastic then to be symmetrically distributed with 
mean zero. Our finding of perceptions bias implies a wedge between actual and perceived values of 
real variables which may represent a substantial modification to some models, and our finding of 
serially correlated perceptions errors would constitute an independent source of persistence. 
Inflation perceptions also play an important indirect role in macroeconomic models through their 
influence on forward-looking inflation expectations, where these are modelled as adaptive 
(extrapolating perceptions of past and/or current inflation), forward-looking (in which case the 
forecast model is likely to be conditioned on inflation perceptions), or some hybrid of the two. 
Empirically, consumer inflation perceptions are so consistently close to consumer inflation 
expectations in our Swedish data (see Figure 2 in the Appendix) that a model of inflation 
expectations as extrapolating currently perceived inflation into the next period seems plausible. 
Similarly, Simmons and Weiserbs (1992) find that predicting inflation using survey expectations 
relative to the base of perceived (rather than actual) inflation “works rather well”, and Benford & 
Driver (2008) find that 40% of UK households claim their current perception of inflation is a very 
important factor in setting their expectations. Reviewing the literature, Raynard et al (2008) 
conclude that the available evidence points to projecting current inflation into the future to be a 
plausible model of people’s actual cognitive heuristics. Therefore inflation perception errors are 
likely to feed through to forward-looking inflation expectation errors, thus violating the assumption 
of REH made in many macroeconomic models. 
6.3 Quantification of forward-looking inflation expectations 
Most of survey data on forward-looking inflation expectations derives from responses to qualitative 
questions like this one from European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs (2014): “By comparison with the past 12 months, how do you expect that consumer prices 
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 Strictly our perceptions measure is representative of the population at large rather than the labour force. 
Palmqvist and Strömberg (2004) reports that for 2001m11 to 2004m5 that perceptions of the 63% of the 
population in the labour force exhibits smaller bias than the population at large, but the bias is still substantial 
and positive. 
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will develop in the next 12 months? Increase more rapidly / increase at the same rate / increase at a 
slower rate / stay about the same / fall / don’t know”. Typically a quantitative inflation expectation 
value is desired, whether to study its properties as a cardinal forecast of official inflation figures, as 
conditioning data for empirical macroeconomic forecast models, or as an input to policy-making.  
Producing quantitative estimates from the available qualitative data necessitates assumptions about 
the properties of the relationship between inflation perceptions and outturns or, equivalently, about 
the properties of inflation perception errors. The 'probability' method of quantification Carlson & 
Parkin (1975) for trichotomous response data assumes that inflation perceptions are error-free. Its 
widely-used extension to pentachotomous data due to Batchelor and Orr (1988) requires a scaling 
series upon which inflation perceptions are assumed to be based. Defining such a series implies 
restrictions on inflation perceptions errors. One restriction commonly imposed is that inflation 
perceptions are unbiased (e.g. Berk, 1999; Forsells & Kenny, 2004; Gerberding, 2001; Lein & Maag, 
2011). Less stringently, Dräger, Menz, & Fritsche (2014) assume that households correctly perceive a 
medium-term trend of the true inflation rate extracted using a Hodrick-Prescott filter, which would 
imply long-run unbiasedness of inflation perceptions. 
Our findings of inflation perceptions bias in both short and long run thus raise questions over the 
quality of the derived quantitative consumer/household inflation expectations numbers that are 
widely used in monetary policy making (e.g. Bernanke, 2004).
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Appendix 
Monetary policy timeline 
Table 9: Monetary policy events in Sweden, 1991–2007 
 
Date Monetary policy event 
1991m5 Krona unilaterally pegged to the European Currency Unit (ECU) 
1992m11 Fixed exchange rate regime collapses on 19 Nov; krona de-pegged from ECU 
and trade-weighted exchange rate rapidly depreciates, losing about 25% of its 
value by end of 1993. This induces an inflationary impulse through 1993 and 
1994 
1993m1 Announcement (on 14 Jan) of plan to begin inflation targeting in 1995 with 
annual increase in CPI to be limited to of 2%±1% 
1993–1994 Riksbank aims monetary policy at "preventing the inflationary impulse, due to 
the depreciation of the krona and changes in indirect taxes, from causing an 
increase in the underlying rate of inflation"* 
1995m1 Inflation target becomes officially operational 
1995m1–1995m12 Implicit inflation forecast targeting (not based on published inflation forecasts) 
1996m1–1997m12 Explicit inflation forecast targeting (based on published inflation forecasts) 
1998m1–2007m12 Inflation distribution forecast targeting 
Notes: Based on (Berg, 2000). * Source: Sveriges Riksbank, Press Release No. 5, 1993. 
 
Unit root tests 
Table 10: Unit root tests  
 
Variable 1993m1-2007m12 1994m1-2007m12 
Test statistic 95% critical value Test statistic 95% critical value 
𝜋𝑡
12 -0.966 
-2.046 
-1.732 
-2.053 
?̃?𝑡
12 including 
extreme responses 
-2.578 -2.555 
?̃?𝑡
12 excluding 
extreme responses 
-1.631 -2.632 
Notes: Test statistic is the DF-GLS test statistic of Elliott et al. (1996) using one lag as selected by Schwarz information 
criterion, d93 and dgfk dummies but no deterministic trend (consistent with visual examination of the data).  
 
Inflation expectations cf. perceptions 
The expectations question in the SCB’s monthly Consumer Tendency Survey is worded:  
"Compared with today, by what percentage do you think that prices will go up (i.e. the rate of 
inflation 12 months from now)?" 
Figure 2 shows four series: 
 expectations error relative to actual inflation: 𝜋𝑡|𝑡+12
𝑒,12 − 𝜋𝑡+12
12  
 expectations error relative to perceptions baseline 𝜋𝑡|𝑡+12
𝑒,12 − ?̃?𝑡+12
12  
 expectations–perceptions difference: 𝜋𝑡|𝑡+12
𝑒,12 − ?̃?𝑡
12 
 12-month change in inflation: 𝜋𝑡+12
12 − 𝜋𝑡
12 
where 𝜋𝑡|𝑡+12
𝑒,12  is the expectation formed in period t about 𝜋𝑡+12
12 . 
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Figure 2: Difference between expectations of inflation over next 12 months, and perceptions of 
inflation over last 12 months, based on responses from same survey, Sweden, 1993m1–2007m12 
 
Including extreme responses  Excluding extreme responses  
  
Note: SCB/GfK did not publish their criterion for classifying a response as 'extreme', so we do no know whether the 
extreme expectations responses are from the same respondents as the extreme perceptions responses. In more detailed 
(and rigorous) econometric analysis we would clarify this. 
 
Notice that the expectations–perceptions difference (today's forecast of future inflation cf. today’s 
perception of today’s inflation) is close to mean-zero (mean of 0.21 or 0.17 including and excluding 
extreme responses respectively) and is considerably less volatile than the other series plotted 
(standard deviation of 0.49 or 0.33 compared to 0.95 or 1.05 for the expectations error relative to 
perception baseline, 1.14 or 1.21 for expectation errors relative to actual inflation, and 1.44 for 12-
month change in inflation). 
This strongly suggests that inflation expectations are based more on current inflation perceptions 
than on actual inflation, in which case many of the properties of inflation expectations examined in 
the literature to date may be inherited from the perceptions formation mechanism. 
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